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the publication of its order in the Colorado Reports, has not written a clarifying opinion. Regardless of the rationale of the decision, however, it is a landmark in the development of the law of
unauthorized practice in Colorado and should be recognized as
such. It demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Court, in
a clear case, to handle these problems with efficiency and dispatch.
Every lawyer in Colorado who recognizes his duty to the public
to protect it from the evils of spurious legal advice and his corrolary duty to protect himself and his profession from the constantly increasing encroachments of those who would practice
law without a license, may take heart from this decision.
WM. RANN NEWCOMB, Chairman,
Unauthorized Practiceof Law Committee,
The Denver Bar Association.

CASE COMMENTS
MIGRATORY DIVORCE -THE
GHOST OF MRS. HADDOCK GETS A SCARE (COOK v. COOK) '-Discovering that Mrs.
Cook was yet married to a Mr. Mann, Mr. Cook sent her to Florida
to clear the whole thing up. Coming back with a Florida divorce,
and, no doubt, a lovely tan, Miss Migratory and her lad tried the
marriage vow again. Unfortunately, the new Mrs. Cook was not at
peace in her heart, so off she went to Hawaii where she just happened to pick up a decree of separation and maintenance. Mr. Cook,
on the other hand, wasn't going to take it lying down. Why should
he when the Supreme Court of Vermont, with Mrs. Cook appearing,
would annul both of their marriages. It looked like Mr. Cook finally
cooked Mrs. Cook's goose. But, alas, Mr. Justice Douglas and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter have their differences, you know, and
Mr. Justice Douglas was not about to let the ghost of Haddock v.
Haddock 2 enjoy squatters' rights into perpetuity. That is, not
without a good old Olson and Johnson scare in parting.
One would suppose that the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Douglas would not place a stumbling block in the path of the
victorious Williams v. North Carolina3 the Second, even if Mr.
Justice Frankfurter did dig up a ghost there. He could have emphasized so many things such as estoppel, condonation and collusion; such as collateral attack, void and voidable; such as domicile and presumptions in favor of competency of the members of
Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct. 157.
Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906). For some comments see Beale,
"Haddock Revisited," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1926); Vreeland, "Mr. and Mrs.
Haddock," 20 A. B. A. J. 568 (1934).
IWilliams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
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the Supreme Court of Vermont. Yes, this latter most particularly
since he was more than gracious in according such presumption
to the Florida Court. And Mr. Justice Frankfurter? Well, just
4
the First, and in
as was the case in Williams v. North Carolina,
Sherrer v. Sherrer 5 and Coe v. Coe,6 the gentleman went back to
dissenting.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 7 has
perhaps received its greatest interpretation when applied to the
recognition of divorce judgments. Since our law considers the
termination of marital status as a matter of state concern, it
readily followed that the laws of the state of the domicile would
control from a social science point of view. Ditson v. Ditson 1 may
be taken as an early (1856) example of this legal position. In
Atherton v. Atherton 9 (1901) the United States Supreme Court
compelled the New York court to recognize a Kentucky divorce
stating that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit
"because the husband always had his domicile in Kentucky and the
matrimonial domicile of the parties was in Kentucky." But five
years later the recalcitrant New York court again caused the
Supreme Court to consider the problem. In Haddock v. Haddock 10
the court sustained New York's refusal to recognize a Connecticut
divorce since the wife had not appeared in response to publication
(it being questionable who the court considered deserted whom).
The court said that it must always be borne in mind that where
full faith and credit is involved, the question of jurisdiction of the
court rendering the decree is always open to attack by a party
who was not personally served or did not enter an appearance.1'
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented, denying any distinction as to the
Atherton case and recalling that the Haddock case was parallel
in the fact situation to the Ditson case upon which the court relied
in Atherton v. Atherton. Then in the first Williams case, 12 the
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Douglas "expressly overruled
the Haddock case." Apparently the decision meant that a decree
granted ex parte by a court which finds petitioning spouse to be a
domiciliary without regard to length of sojourn is entitled to full
faith and credit so far as it determined the marital status. In the
second Williams case 13 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented
in the first case, wrote the majority opinion which seemed to restore Haddock v. Haddock. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented to the
recognition of prima facie evidence of domicile while at the same
Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
1 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
'Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
Art. IV, Section 1.
I Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87.
9Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901).
"Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (1906).
" Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 settled the general issue in 1874.
"Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
" Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
4
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time holding that the fact of domicile as a jurisdictional factor
may be determined de novo by the court in a questioning state.
Sherrer v. Sherrer,14 Coe v. Coe 15 and Johnson v. Muelberger 16
shed more light on the problem and limited the chances for denying
full faith and credit by barring a spouse from later questioning
jurisdiction if (1) the issue of domicile had been contested by the
spouse on appearance at the trial, or (2) if the spouse appeared
and admitted the other's domicile, or (3) if the spouse had been
personally served in the divorce state.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Vermont 17 came two
years after the Sherrer and Coe decisions. The Vermont Court
had chosen to disregard theories of estoppel, collusion and fraud
on the court. This it had a right to do even according to the dissent in this case. The court, in annulling both marriages, certainly must have determined that none of the three situations mentioned above were present here for it permitted Mr. Cook to collaterally attack the judgment as to Mrs. Mann's domicile. This,
of course, was Mr. Justice Jackson's position in the dissent. Mr.
Justice Douglas, however, felt that the Vermont record did not
clearly show that the first husband had not appeared, and thus
that the first husband was yet in a position to contest jurisdiction.
The court stated, 18 "For until Florida's jurisdiction is shown to
be vulnerable, Vermont may not relitigate the issue of domicile
on which the Florida decree rests". Thus, the language of the
second Williams case was flaunted in the face of its writer. With
this the court remanded the cause to Vermont for proceedings
not inconsistent with its opinion.
Dedication to a cause is the highest of judicial attributes.
But one sometimes wonders whether this characteristic is being
sacrificed rather than nurtured in the give and take of judicial
pugilistics. In any event the attorney now must ascertain that
the court is clearly setting forth the facts showing lack of jurisdiction in the divorce state which will justify its refusal to recognize the divorce collaterally attacked. This is so despite the fact
that such a refusal could be based on no other findings than that
those considerations are present. Perhaps placing the responsibility on the attorney is as it should be. Realizing the failure of
federal legislation to determine the manner in which full faith
and credit is to be realized, Mr. Justice Robert Jackson earlier
"Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
"Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
"Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951).
"Cook v. Cook, 116 Vt. 374, 76 A- 2d 593.
"Cook v. Cook, 72 S. Ct. 157, 160 (1951) The court felt entitled to assume
a limited view because of the burden placed upon one assailing the decree
of a sister state by Williams v. State of North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 at page
234, and also by Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Esenwein,
325 U. S. 279, 280-281 (1945). The court further stated that it dealt only with
the presumption not with the issues on which the Vermont court made its
findings. Cook v. Cook, supra, at page 160.
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has registered such a charge to the legal profession. 19 In fact
he considers the Full
Faith and Credit Clause as "peculiarly the
20
attorneys' clause".
GEORGE F. BARBARY.

DIVORCE FORMS CORRECTED
It has been called to the attention of the subcommittee on
District Court Forms, that the acceptance of service to be used
in divorce litigation shown at page 95 of Volume XXIX, Number 3,
Dicta (March, 1952), is incorrect in that it does not comply with
Rule 4 (i) 5, of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides as follows:
"Proof of service of process shall be made as follows: . . . . by the admission or waiver of service by
the person to be served, duly acknowledged."
In view of this error, waiver of service to be used in divorce
litigation should read as follows:
"STATE OF COLORADO,
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERfSS"
I, Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn, being duly sworn, state that
I am of full age, am the defendant in this action, have received
a copy of the summons and complaint and accept service thereof,
and state that I am not now in the Military Service.
Reginald Phinehas Hpuiwmn.
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me this 15th
day of February, 1952.
Sally N. Doakes,
Notary Public.
My commission expires September 20, 1953."
Royal C. Rubright chairman,
Forms Standardization Committee.
Donald M. Lesher, Chairman
Subcommittee on District Court Forms.
"Robert H. Jackson, "Full Faith and Credit," 45 Col. L. Rev. 1, 33.
0While
the 1948 Judiciary Code (28 U. S. C. 1738) adds some certainty to
the situation, it probably does not relieve the attorney of the burden referred
to by Justice Jackson.

